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Abstract
I investigate the link between economic fundamentals and exchange
rate adjustment to commodity price fluctuations. I overcome the tra-
ditional issue of simultaneity by exploiting the September 14, 2019
drone attack on two Saudi Arabian refineries as a natural experiment.
This unanticipated event caused the largest 1-day global crude oil
price shock in over a decade. Using high-frequency exchange rate
data for 30 countries, I link the cross-section of currency movements
around the event to country-specific economic and financial funda-
mentals. Crude export and import intensities were associated with
appreciation (depreciation). Additionally, countries with higher pol-
icy interest rates and weaker financial positions experienced greater
currency depreciation while safe haven currencies appreciated, consis-
tent with ’risk-off’ sentiment triggering carry trades to unwind. I also
find that across currencies, estimated (pre-event) crude oil and VIX
betas are tightly associated with oil-related and financial fundamen-
tals, respectively. Therefore, exchange rate adjustment around the
drone attack can also be explained by currency risk factors.
∗University of Southern California, Economics Department, rashadah@usc.edu. The
author would like to thank Joshua Aizenman and an anonymous reviewer for helpful
comments and suggestions.
1 Introduction
The complex relationship between commodity prices and exchange rates is
of great interest to international economists and policymakers, especially for
those focusing on resource-dependent open economies [See Edwards (1986)[6],
Chen and Rogoff (2003)[4], Cashin et al. (2004)[3], and Aizenman et al.
(2012)[2].]. Despite the rich literature on exchange rate adjustment to com-
modity shocks, establishing causality under this context remains challenging
because of simultaneity: it’s possible that exchange rate fluctuations cause
commodity prices to adjust [Chen et al. (2010)[5]] or for commodity fluctu-
ations to impact exchange rates under the assumption that open economies
are price takers in the world commodity market1. Several studies report evi-
dence of predictability or cointegration [Chen et al. (2010)[5], Lee and Chen
(2014)[10], Kohlscheen et al. (2017)[9], among others.], oft considered the
second-best approach when causal identification can’t be achieved.
This paper takes an alternative approach to identify the causal effect
of commodity prices on exchange rates. I exploit the September 14, 2019
surprise attack on two Saudi Arabian oil refineries as a natural experiment,
where this completely unanticipated shock to global crude oil supplies sent
world crude prices sharply higher, leading to the largest 1-day spike in over
a decade. Using high-frequency data on exchange rates across 30 countries, I
measure exchange rate adjustment around the window of the unanticipated
oil shock and link the heterogeneity in exchange rate adjustment back to
various country-specific fundamentals. Consistent with the literature, I find
that both a country’s trade-related oil exposure - and financial/monetary
conditions - jointly explain exchange rate adjustment to the oil shock. This
suggests that the drone attack caused oil prices to jump but also may have
triggered risk-off sentiment. Heavier crude exporters (importers) saw greater
appreciation (depreciation). Current account surpluses and greater interna-
tional reserves were associated with exchange rate appreciation. Consistent
with risk-off sentiment, countries with higher policy interest rates, usually
observed among Emerging Market economies and carry trade candidates,
saw greater depreciation. At least in the very short-run, this evidence of
exchange rate adjustment goes against the conventional view that exchange
rates are un-responsive to commodity supply shocks [Basher et al. (2015)[13]
and Habib et al. (2016)[8]].
1As done in several of the mentioned papers. A reasonable assumption though with ex-
ceptions: Russia as an oil exporter, OPEC countries as a coordinating organization, China
as an importer of copper, Chile as an exporter of copper, United States corn production.
1
Finally, under a conventional asset pricing framework, I estimate (ex ante)
currency factor betas to test whether such risk factors also explain exchange
rate movements around the event. Using monthly data from 2010 through
August 2019 (up to but before the event), I estimate crude oil, global volatil-
ity (VIX) and U.S. Dollar betas, finding that currency-specific exposures to
crude oil and global volatility together can explain nearly half of the vari-
ation in exchange rates around the drone attack, while the role of the U.S.
dollar was minimal over this event. Moreover, many empirical asset pricing
studies which find priced risk factors do not focus on ’what’ drives risk ex-
posure heterogeneity. Along these lines, I report evidence highlighting the
tight association between the cross section of VIX betas and country finan-
cials (interest rates, current accounts and international reserves), supportive
of Menkhoff et al. (2012)[11]. Estimated oil betas are strongly associated
with country oil-related fundamentals.
2 September 14, 2019 Oil Supply Shock
2.1 Crude Oil Prices
In Saudi Arabia on September 14, 2019, drones were used in a surprise at-
tack on two of the largest Saudi Aramco oil refineries - state-owned facilities:
Abqaiq and Khurais in Eastern Saudi Arabia (Figure 1). According to the
Saudi Arabian interior ministry, the flames induced by the attack were put
out relatively quickly, but both facilities were shut down for repairs, tem-
porarily cutting the country’s oil production (about 5 percent of global pro-
duction) by about half. Despite the country communicating that it will tap
into its oil reserves to buffer the supply shock, the news led to the sharpest
one-day rise in global crude oil prices in over a decade.
Figure 2 shows that as the futures market opened on the subsequent
Sunday evening, crude oil futures prices jumped over 10 percent from roughly
$55 per barrel to $61, and then continued to rise through Monday to a peak
of over $63. While the drones struck when markets were closed, the opening
gap largely represents the market response to the news, as no other news
over the weekend were released that could have had such an unprecedented
impact on crude oil prices.
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Figure 1: September 14, 2019 Drone Attacks
Source: VOAnews.com
Figure 2: Intra-day WTI Crude Oil Futures Re-
sponse to 9/14 Drone Attack
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2.2 Exchange Rate Adjustment
Meanwhile, as foreign exchange markets around the world opened, currency
responses varied widely. Naturally, many countries which do not have oil-
intensive dependencies continued to operate as ’business as usual’. In con-
trast, exchange rates of Russia, Norway, and Canada - major oil exporters
- saw sudden appreciation. Other countries observed marked depreciation,
including India and South Korea - notable petroleum importers.
Interestingly, the Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc appreciated while Turk-
ish and South African currencies realized considerable depreciation. The
former (latter) countries are well known to be safe havens (financially frag-
ile) with low (high) interest rates respectively, suggesting that the event also
triggered ’risk-off’ related carry trades to unwind. Figure 3 reports visually
the heterogeneity observed in exchange rate responses before and after news
of the oil supply shock. Figure 8 breaks down the exchange rate responses
by country upon market open.
What determined the varying exchange rate responses to the oil shock?
Visually, it appears that crude oil dependency is a relevant factor determin-
ing whether the exchange rate experienced meaningful adjustment. But as
the theoretical literature suggests, there are other interactions which could
amplify otherwise limited commodity exposure especially if the event also
impacted investor risk appetite, such as a currency’s inherent riskiness, or a
country’s net financial position, credit worthiness, monetary regime, etc.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Data
For a sample of 30 countries, I collect intra-day exchange rate data at the
30-minute frequency around the weekend of the Saudi refinery strike from
Bloomberg. The sample contains 12 developed market currencies (includ-
ing the G10 less United States), and 18 emerging market currencies. All
exchange rates are vis-a-vis the USD, and a positive change implies appreci-
ation against the U.S. Dollar.
I also compile a cross-sectional data set on country-specific trade and fi-
nancial fundamentals from various public sources: UN COMTRADE, IMF,
World Bank, and the CIA World Factbook. The most recent data is taken
mostly from 2018/2019, but on some occasions the statistics are dated from
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Figure 3: Intra-day Exchange Rate Response to
9/14 Drone Attack
15-minute frequency data. All currencies vis-a-vis
the USD. Positive change is appreciation against
the USD.
2017. Tables 2 and 3 report sample mean and standard deviations respec-
tively, across all countries and for Developed Market Economies (DMEs) and
Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) subgroups. China is by far, the largest
country in the sample by GDP (over $12 trillion), which pulls up the average
GDP of EMEs to be comparable to DMEs, though EME GDP is nearly twice
as volatile. While most crude / refined petroleum trade variables are bal-
anced across countries, DMEs import considerably more refined petroleum
than EMEs. EMEs tend to have lower current count surpluses than DMEs,
on average, along with larger external debt/GDP and lower public debt/GDP
and international reserves/GDP. Policy interest rates are much higher and
more varied among EMEs than DMEs. Many DMEs have rates pinned near
the effective lower bound, explaining both their lower average level and stan-
dard deviation.
3.2 High-Frequency Identification
Truly exogenous macroeconomic shocks are rare. Therefore, the unantici-
pated attacks on Saudi oil refineries make for a valuable case study because
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the direction of causality between commodity prices and exchange rates is
unambiguous. Moreover, an isolated shock to a specific commodity - crude
oil - provides valuable cross-sectional heterogeneity in exchange rates, which
I aim to link back to the variation in fundamentals across countries. High-
frequency event studies are ubiquitous in the macro-finance literature (See
Gurkaynak and Wright (2013)[7] for a survey. Aizenman et al. (2016)[1] and
Neely (2015)[12] specifically look at exchange rate responses to monetary pol-
icy in an event study framework). The key identification assumption is that
within the window of the event, no other news or fundamental changes occur
which would impact the exchange rate. Because we are analyzing a narrow
window of exchange rate responses, the assumption is reasonably satisfied.
Exchange rates of several non oil-intensive countries remained relatively quiet
over the event window, supporting the absence of additional market-moving
macroeconomic news announcements over the event period.
Cross-country fundamentals are taken as fixed over the event window.
Because country fundamentals tend to evolve slowly, and almost certainly
do not rapidly vary from day-to-day, the assumption of fundamentals being
exogenous over the event window is very likely to hold. Moreover, since the
data on fundamentals updates with a lag, using data from 2017-2019 up until
the event also ensures against any potential endogeneity.
3.3 Regression Analysis
Let the percent change in the exchange rate vis-a-vis the USD (where positive
change implies local appreciation against the USD) be denoted as:
∆ei,ab =
Ei,a − Ei,b
Ei,b
, (1)
where ∆ei,ab is the exchange rate percent return of country i from period
b (before event) to period a (after event). Ei,a and Ei,b are the corresponding
nominal exchange rate levels, before and after the event. For each coun-
try, the before-period corresponds to the exchange rate recorded at the close
of 9/13. Most recorded closing values are from 16:30:00 EST, though clos-
ing times vary across FX markets2. Post-event exchange rates are mostly
recorded on 9/15 20:00:003. The constructed returns capture the percent
change in exchange rates over the period of the oil supply shock.
2For Peru and Malaysia values are taken from 14:30:00 and 11:30:00 EST, respectively.
3With the exception of: India (9/15 20:30:00), Malaysia, Sweden, Hungary, and Colom-
bia (all of which have new prints by 9/16 05:00:00).
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The following regression specification tests the effect of fundamentals on
exchange rate adjustment around the shock:
∆ei,ab = α + β
′Xi + ǫi, (2)
where [OXi, OIi, RXi, RIi, CAi, EDi, PDi, IRi, ri] ∈ Xi and OXi and
OIi are crude oil exports/GDP and crude oil imports/GDP, respectively.
RXi and RIi are refined petroleum exports and imports (normalized by
GDP). CAi is the current account surplus/GDP. EDi and PDi are exter-
nal debt/GDP and public debt/GDP, respectively. IRi are international
reserves/GDP, and ri is the nominal policy interest rate of the country. The
intercept term, α, captures the average change vis-a-vis the USD across all
exchange rates, or ∆e¯ab. Because the average exchange rate return is statis-
tically indifferent from zero, I restrict the regression intercept to equal zero
to preserve degrees of freedom4.
Table 1: Cross-section correlation, FX returns over
event window and economic fundamentals
OXi OIi RXi RIi CAi EDi PDi IRi ri
∆ei,ab 0.58 -0.37 -0.05 -0.14 0.15 0.12 0.18 0.15 -0.34
Table 1 reports sample cross-section correlations between exchange rate
returns over the event period and different economic variables. Unsurpris-
ingly, heavier exporters and importers of crude oil appreciated and depre-
ciated on average following the supply shock. More intriguingly, exposure
to refined petroleum trade is considerably weaker, and countries with higher
interest rates also experienced depreciation, suggesting that potential risk-off
sentiment impacted carry trade currencies - a factor which should be con-
trolled for.
4 Baseline Results
The regression results are reported in Figure 4. Interesting interactions be-
tween a country’s crude oil exposure and financial condition emerge. Refined
petroleum exports and imports are not significant upon including crude oil
imports and exports. Crude oil exporters and importers reacted to the oil
shock as expected, by appreciating and depreciating, respectively. Though
4∆e¯ab is equal to -0.0007, t-stat of -1.13.
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the cumulative exchange rate change may have been economically small given
the very short time horizon (Figure 3), this evidence of reacting to a supply
shock - albeit in the short-run - goes against the conventional view that ex-
change rates do not react to supply shocks5.
The first few columns of the results highlight a potential asymmetry,
where importers’ exchange rates were doubly sensitive to the oil shock com-
pared to exporters. The asymmetry disappears in column 5 upon includ-
ing policy interest rates which itself has significant explanatory power over
exchange rate responses. Column 5 implies that a country with exports
(imports)/GDP of 0.05, or 5%, would have appreciated (depreciated) by an
expected +0.48% (-0.64%) in response to the oil shock6. Countries with
higher policy rates, composed mostly of EMEs and carry trade currencies,
saw their exchange rates depreciate relative to low interest rate currencies.
Akin to carry trade unwinding7, the significant explanatory power of interest
rates suggests that the oil supply shock also contained a ’risk-off’ component.
Similarly, countries with current account deficits saw their exchange rates de-
preciate relative to those with surpluses, but this effect becomes insignificant
after jointly including international reserves/GDP (IR) and policy rates.
Consistent with the drone attack exhibiting global risk-off sentiment, ex-
change rates of countries with higher IR and lower policy rates saw their
currencies buffered, depreciating less. Conversely, those with lower IR and
higher policy rates saw their exchange rates depreciate more. Debt variables,
are insignificant, and the full specification can explain 62 percent of the cross-
sectional variation in exchange rate responses around the oil shock, half of
which (about 30%) is attributed to the country’s crude oil exposure. Overall
the results are consistent with the view that exchange rates adjusted to oil
shock via both the trade channel and financial channels and that the shock
contained a global risk-off component8.
A limitation of this study is that I consider a single, specific event. More-
over, high-frequency identification comes at the cost of only obtaining short-
run effect estimates. We cannot generalize these short-run claims to the
long-run without making unreasonably strong assumptions. Despite this lim-
5Habib et al. (2016)[8], Basher et al. (2015)[13].
6Russia and Norway have greater than 6% exports/GDP. Singapore and Taiwan have
greater than 6% imports/GDP.
7A carry trade is a currency investment strategy which borrows low interest rate cur-
rencies and invests in high interest rate currencies.
8Aizenman et al (2012)[2] and Lee and Chen (2014)[10].
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itation, most studies on commodity currencies focus on the longer run, thus
this approach provides a novel view of the phenomena.
4.1 Carry Trade and Safe Haven Currencies
An important finding thus far is that financial characteristics - specifically
interest rates and international reserves - explain a significant proportion
of variation across exchange rate responses. Specifically, high (low) interest
rate countries depreciated (appreciated), suggesting that the drone attack
triggered to some degree ’risk-off’ sentiment driving the unwinding of cur-
rency carry trades, resulting in appreciation (depreciation) of safe haven
(investment) currencies. For example, the Japanese Yen and Swiss Franc
strengthened considerably, while the South African Rand and Turkish Lira
depreciated relative to the U.S. Dollar (Figure 8).
Motivated by this, an important variable to control for in the regression-
based tests is the ’riskiness’ of the currency which may not be properly
captured by a country’s financial fundamentals (policy rate, international
reserves, current account). As a robustness check, I follow Menkhoff et al.
(2012)[11] and define currencies as risky based on their covariance with a
measure of global volatility - log changes in the VIX index9 - thereby esti-
mating currency-specific ’VIX betas’. I estimate these betas using time-series
regressions for each currency, at the monthly10 frequency, from January 2010
to August 2019. As such, these are ex-ante betas which do not include the
period containing the drone attack:
∆ei,t = αi + β(v)i∆vixt + ǫi,t, (3)
where ∆ei,t are monthly log returns for the currency of country i (positive
change is appreciation vis-a-vis the USD) and ∆vixt are monthly changes in
the log VIX index. The estimate βˆ(v)i captures each currency’s VIX beta.
Exchange rates with a positive VIX beta appreciate with the VIX, acting
as hedges, while those with negative VIX betas depreciate amidst a rising
VIX, thereby being pro-cyclical with respect to global risk appetite, and
9Menkhoff et al. (2012)[11] uses the cross-sectional average realized volatility across
currencies. I use the CBOE VIX index, a model-free measure of the implied one-month
ahead SP 500 volatility, often considered a gauge of global risk appetite.
10I choose monthly frequency for these time-series regressions to minimize estimation
bias which may be present in higher frequency observations due to periods of illiquidity
or asynchronous trading hours across foreign exchange markets.
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hence risky. Menkhoff et al. (2012)[11] show that the performance of cur-
rency carry trades are intimately linked to global volatility, with the carry
trade strategy performing most poorly during risk-off episodes amidst high
volatility.
Column 6 in Figure 4 reports results upon controlling for currency-specific
VIX betas. While the coefficient estimate is positive (indicative of safe haven
(risky) currencies appreciating (depreciating) over the event window) it is
statistically insignificant, possibly due to the the inclusion of policy interest
rates and international reserves as independent variables which are already
incorporating to some extent the inherent riskiness of the currency. In a
regression which excludes the policy rate, the coefficient on VIX betas is
positive and significant at the 7% level11. Excluding the policy rate, inter-
national reserves, and current account surpluses from the regression renders
the VIX beta coefficient estimate significant at the 2% level. There appears
to be a link between the unobserved global volatility exposure and financial
fundamentals. In fact, regressing VIX betas on policy rates and international
reserves yields a regression adjusted R2 of 50%. Including the current account
and allowing for interaction terms between the three variables increases the
adjusted R2 to 64% (unadjusted R2 is over 70%). Financial characteristics
explain much of the heterogeneity in currency-specific estimates of global risk
exposure.
5 The Role of Currency Risk Factors
The previous analyses investigated the role fundamentals in explaining cur-
rency returns around the oil price shock. Given the link between financial
fundamentals and currency exposures to global volatility, another test of in-
terest would be to measure to what extent currency risk factor exposures ex-
plain differential returns around the drone attack compared to economic fun-
damentals. If currency exposures proxy for fundamentals, then they should
also explain the cross-section of returns around the event window. An impor-
tant question then, would be to what extent crude oil commodity exposure
drove exchange rates versus exposure to global risk through the lens of an
asset pricing factor model.
To address this issue, I extend the factor analysis on monthly exchange
rate returns to estimate ex ante exposure to the VIX, crude oil, and the
11Robust standard errors. Estimates are not reported but available upon request.
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broad U.S. Dollar:
∆ei,t = αi + β(v)i∆vixt + β(o)i∆oilt + β(u)i∆usdt + ǫi,t, (4)
where now for each currency i, I estimate a VIX beta, a crude oil beta
(using monthly WTI crude oil log returns) and a U.S. Dollar beta (using the
average log return over G10 (ex. U.S.) exchange rates).
Figure 6 shows that cross-currency heterogeneity in the estimated VIX
and oil betas can be well explained by select economic fundamentals. A cur-
rency’s exposure to global risk (more negative VIX betas) is associated with
higher policy interest rates, larger current account deficits and lower levels of
international reserves/GDP. In addition, countries where the proportion of
total trade which is crude or refined petroleum have higher estimated crude
oil betas (correlation of 0.87). Similarly a currency’s crude oil beta is strongly
associated with the country’s oil exports/GDP (correlation of 0.75) and im-
ports/GDP. Figure 7 plots factor betas against the intra-day currency returns
around the 9/14 drone attack. The role of the U.S. Dollar appears to not be
an important factor driving currency returns around this particular shock.
However, currencies with greater ex ante exposure to global volatility (nega-
tive VIX betas) realized greater depreciation, and somewhat unsurprisingly,
currencies with greater ex ante exposure to crude oil saw greater apprecia-
tion. Hence, the estimated volatility and oil betas appear to capture similar
features as financial and oil-related country fundamentals, respectively.
Figure 5 reports results from a regression of currency returns over the
drone attack, ∆ei,ab, on the estimated ex ante crude oil, VIX, and U.S. Dol-
lar betas. For interpretation and comparison of the regression coefficients,
the factor beta variables have been standardized to mean 0 and unit vari-
ance. Just two factors capturing ex-ante exposure to crude oil and VIX
innovations can explain almost half of the cross-sectional variation in ex-
change rates around the oil supply shock. While both global volatility and
oil prices both influenced exchange rates, exposure to crude oil (estimate
of 0.0023) was twice as strong of a driver compared to global volatility ex-
posure (estimate of 0.0012) in determining currency movements around the
event. Moreover, crude oil betas alone explain 37% of the variation in cur-
rency returns. Including VIX betas in the regression increases the adjusted
R2 by 7 percentage points to 44%. In the context of this specific event, ex-
ante exposure to the U.S. Dollar did not meaningfully drive exchange rate
adjustment.
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6 Conclusion
Exchange rate adjustment to commodity price fluctuations is an important
topic to understand for economists and policymakers, yet causal inference
remains challenging. To overcome the issue of simultaneity, I exploit the
September 14, 2019 drone attack on two Saudi Arabian refineries as a nat-
ural experiment. This unanticipated event caused the largest 1-day crude
oil price shock in over a decade. Using high-frequency exchange rate data
for 30 countries, I measure currency returns around the oil shock, and link
cross-currency return heterogeneity to country-specific trade and financial
fundamentals. Trade exposure through exports and imports of crude oil,
international reserves holdings, policy interest rates, and current account po-
sition together explain over half of the cross-country variation in exchange
rate adjustment to the oil price shock. Along with commodity-related cur-
rency adjustment, the significant role of financial variables and interest rates
suggest that the drone attack triggered risk-off sentiment affecting carry
trade and safe haven currencies alongside commodity currencies. Alterna-
tive to fundamentals, ex ante estimated currency factor exposures to crude
oil prices and global volatility can also explain the cross-section of currency
returns around the event. These oil and global volatility factor exposures are
strongly associated with cross-country crude oil-related and financial funda-
mentals, respectively.
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Figure 4: Regression Results
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Figure 5: Currency Factor Regression Results
Figure 6: Ex Ante Currency Betas and Fundamen-
tals
Ex ante currency betas are estimated using
monthly frequency data from 2010 to August 2019.
Beta estimates are taken from Equation 4.
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Figure 7: Ex Ante Currency Betas and Intra-day
Exchange Rate Response to 9/14 Drone Attack
Ex ante currency betas are estimated using
monthly frequency data from 2010 to August 2019.
Beta estimates are taken from Equation 4. LHS
correlation estimate equals 0.27 (t= 1.48). Center
correlation equals -0.62 (t= 4.23), RHS correlation
equals -0.04 (t=-0.23).
Figure 8: Intra-day Exchange Rate Response to
9/14 Drone Attack
Percent change in exchange rate from 9/13 close
to 9/15 open. All currencies vis-a-vis the USD.
Positive change is appreciation against the USD.
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Table 2: Economic Fundamentals, Sample Mean
Sample Mean All DMEs EMEs
GDP 1454.1000 1433.0000 1468.1667
Exports 342.5167 363.6083 328.4556
Imports 289.2667 336.2917 257.9167
Oil Exported 9.0135 8.8872 9.0977
Refined Exported 10.2014 10.4762 10.0182
Oil Imported 17.4621 16.2467 18.2724
Refined Imported 9.1934 12.4512 7.0215
Crude/GDP -0.0042 -0.0069 -0.0024
Crude/Trade 0.0002 -0.0033 0.0025
Trade Openness 0.6326 0.6440 0.6250
Current Account/GDP 0.0194 0.0481 0.0002
External Debt/GDP 1.0050 1.7775 0.4900
Public Debt/GDP 0.5814 0.7501 0.4689
Int’l Reserves/GDP 0.2755 0.3234 0.2435
Policy Rate 0.0306 0.0069 0.0464
N 30 12 18
Values (first 7 rows) in USD ($ Billions). Data
taken from various public sources: UN COM-
TRADE, IMF IFS, CIA World Factbook and
World Bank. All Statistics are from 2018/2019 or
latest available date.
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Table 3: Economic Fundamentals, Sample Stan-
dard Deviation
Sample Standard Deviation All DMEs EMEs
GDP 2318.0396 1521.1746 2769.1932
Exports 466.3483 352.5479 538.5630
Imports 324.2887 302.0441 343.1659
Oil Exported 20.2255 16.7850 22.7048
Refined Exported 14.2736 12.0371 15.9282
Oil Imported 30.7564 17.4262 37.6225
Refined Imported 9.4871 12.0207 6.8958
Crude GDP 0.0310 0.0347 0.0292
Crude Trade 0.0701 0.0583 0.0785
Trade Openness 0.4371 0.4526 0.4395
Current Account/GDP 0.0590 0.0718 0.0404
External Debt/GDP 0.9814 1.1615 0.2608
Public Debt/GDP 0.4074 0.5774 0.1839
Int’l Reserves/GDP 0.2664 0.3922 0.1373
Policy Rate 0.0346 0.0083 0.0366
N 30 12 18
Values (first 7 rows) in USD ($ Billions). Data
taken from various public sources: UN COM-
TRADE, IMF IFS, CIA World Factbook and
World Bank. All Statistics are from 2018/2019 or
latest available date.
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Table 4: Country List
Country EME/DME FX
1 Argentina EME ARSUSD
2 Australia DME AUDUSD
3 Brazil EME BRLUSD
4 Canada DME CADUSD
5 Chile EME CLPUSD
6 China EME CNHUSD
7 Colombia EME COPUSD
8 Czech EME CZKUSD
9 Denmark DME DKKUSD
10 Euro DME EURUSD
11 Hungary EME HUFUSD
12 India EME INRUSD
13 Indonesia EME IDRUSD
14 Japan DME JPYUSD
15 Malaysia EME MYRUSD
16 Mexico EME MXNUSD
17 New Zealand DME NZDUSD
18 Norway DME NOKUSD
19 Peru EME PENUSD
20 Poland EME PLNUSD
21 Russia EME RUBUSD
22 S. Korea EME KRWUSD
23 Singapore DME SGDUSD
24 South Africa EME ZARUSD
25 Sweden DME SEKUSD
26 Switzerland DME CHFUSD
27 Taiwan DME TWDUSD
28 Thailand EME THBUSD
29 Turkey EME TRYUSD
30 United Kingdom DME GBPUSD
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